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1. Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 58 (2002).
2. W. Kramer et al., US Oocyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial
Issues, 24 HUM. REPROD. 3144 (2009).
3. See Karsjens, supra note 1.
4. Ethics Comm. of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007), available at
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/
News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Reports_and_Statements/financial_incentives.pdf.
5. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
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Can we put a price on the human body? This is the uncomfortable and
difficult question that the process of human oocyte (egg) donation presents
to both the legislator and the cash-strapped college student sitting in her
dorm room. It is important at the outset to recognize egg donation for what
it often is: egg sales. Young women are solicited from college campuses to
“donate” their eggs for dollar amounts that can reach the tens of thousands.1 This is a burgeoning business; it is estimated that over 100,000
women have sold or donated eggs to clinics around the country.2 Opposition to this process abounds. A range of scholarship argues that egg sales
contribute to the greater commodification of women’s bodies and exploit
the poor.3 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, which promulgates compensation guidelines for egg donations, notes that a significant
critique of market-based compensation is that such compensation turns the
building blocks of human life into mere products.4
In addition to the ethical controversy over whether to allow egg sales
due to the special nature of reproductive tissue in creating human life, there
are significant risks to the women who sell their eggs. Egg extraction presents numerous serious health risks to those undergoing the process.5 More
than one egg needs to be harvested, as in-vitro fertilization (IVF) is an im-
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6. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145–46.
7. Andrew Zacher, Oocyte Donor Compensation for Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Analysis of New York’s “Payment for Eggs Program”, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 323, 335 (2011).
8. Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 195
(2011).
9. See id. at 195 n.57. Note that other studies have found a much higher rate of OHSS; the
Kramer study referenced previously found that 30.3 percent of women experienced some degree of
OHSS, while 11.6 percent experienced a severe enough case that required hospitalization. Kramer et al.,
supra note 2, at 3146.
10. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145 (noting that most IVF clinics do not keep in contact
with former donors); see also Jennifer Schneider, Case Report: Fatal Colon Cancer in a Young Egg
Donor, FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1.e1 (2008).
11. The FDA does register clinics that perform egg extractions and mandates testing for donors.
What You Should Know—Reproductive Tissue Donation, FDA.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.fda
.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232876.htm.
12. See infra note 88.
13. See infra note 89.
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perfect process that requires more than one attempt in most cases. To accomplish this, doctors administer drugs to stimulate the ovaries. This process sometimes results in a condition called Ovarian Hyper-stimulation
Syndrome (OHSS).6 Serious cases result in the enlargement of the ovaries7
and massive fluid build-up in the body, requiring intensive medical care.8
The rate of OHSS for those undergoing gonadotropin regimens, one of the
most common methods of inducing stimulation, is around 0.3 to 5 percent,
though due to the lack of available data and consistent definitions, that rate
might be higher or lower.9 Anecdotal evidence has also shown that some
frequent egg donors have contracted colon and other cancers thought to be
a result of the process, though there is a dearth of statistical information
precisely because of the lax regulatory environment.10
Critically, these potential harms are not addressed by any coherent,
uniform system of regulation. There are presently no federal regulations on
what risks clinics have to disclose to women.11 Certain states, though few,
have their own regulations. Louisiana explicitly prohibits the sale of eggs,12
while Arizona, for example, permits egg donation but codified mandatory
informed consent standards.13 While this Note argues that the compensation
of egg donors should not be regulated, every state should adopt both advertising and informed consent requirements. Advertising requirements detailing the existence of potential harms may dissuade donors who are not well
aware of the risk of injury from egg extraction. Additionally, informed
consent requirements enable women to make the best choices for their own
health and welfare while allowing them to retain their individual autonomy.
Additionally, no state requires that clinics pay the significant medical
costs associated with serious conditions such as OHSS that can result from
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14. See infra notes 88–98.
15. What is Assisted Reproductive
http://www.cdc.gov/art/.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (2013).
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See Karsjens, supra note 1.
20. Id.
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the egg extraction process.14 This Note argues that clinics should provide
insurance for women undergoing egg extraction or otherwise bear the cost
of potential injuries. Requiring clinics to provide insurance for women who
undergo these procedures places the financial burden on the shoulders of
those who profit most from egg donation: the reproductive services industry. Further, placing the burden on the clinics reduces the potential that
women who donate their eggs might be financially burdened by medical
costs.
Presently, there is no registry recording the rates of harm occurring to
the donors.15 In 1992, Congress passed an existing reporting requirement
relating only to pregnancy success rates by individual ART programs and
the names of the laboratories used.16 This statute required such reports to
flow through the Centers for Disease Control.17 While not a perfectly analogous situation, such a reporting requirement serves as a model for a reporting requirement to evaluate the long-term effects of egg extraction on
egg donors.18 This Note argues that, due to the yet unevaluated potential
long-term risks of OHSS, such as cancer, Congress should create a similar
reporting requirement for long-term side effects. Such a requirement can
increase the ability of regulators to respond to the risks of egg donation as
they become clearer.
Given the increasing demand for egg sales, the practice is likely to
continue. Opponents of the for-profit reproductive industry regard the high
compensation rates as commodification of the human body.19 Other arguments suggest that the process of recruiting financially vulnerable young
women is a new form of exploitation.20 Concededly, there may be elements
of commodification and exploitation in the process. However, these concerns cannot override the important interest an individual has in choosing
what is best for her, including what to do with her own body. This Note
concludes that, given the prevalence of reproductive tissue sales in society
and the likelihood that the demand for eggs will increase, a comprehensive
regulatory regime would account for the problems inherent in the sale of
reproductive tissue while preserving an individual’s autonomy and complete right to her own body.
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This Note is comprised of four parts. Part I outlines the present practice of egg harvesting and sale in the United States. Part II analyzes criticisms of the practice of reproductive tissue sales through the lens of both
public policy and theory. Part III evaluates areas of risk and concern, examining the present regulatory regime surrounding egg donation, and finds
this regime insufficient. Part IV provides several arguments. It argues that
state regulations should mandate informed consent of risks before donations occur. Additionally, clinics that solicit women and extract their eggs
should provide mandatory coverage for medical care in the event that a
serious medical complication such as OHSS arises. Finally, a federal registry should be created to collect information about the long-term health effects of OHSS and other negative externalities.21
I. THE PROCESS

03/25/2015 13:32:44

21. All of the above proposals should pertain as well to self-extraction and extraction without
compensation (i.e., between friends or family members). In fact, disclosure and reporting requirements
are arguably more pertinent since the altruistic may be less likely to engage in risk-reward balancing
and an evaluation of potential harms.
22. Steven R. Lindheim et al., Recruitment and Screening Policies and Procedures Used to Establish a Paid Donor Oocyte Registry, 13 HUM. REPROD. 2020, 2021–22 (1998).
23. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical
Market in Genetic Material, 72 AMER. SOC. REV. 319, 326–29 (2007); see also Genius Egg Donor
DAILY,
May
18,
2012,
at
7,
available
at
Wanted,
STANFORD
http://www.scribd.com/doc/94009954/DAILY-05-18-12.
24. See, e.g., For Donors, APERFECTMATCH.COM,
http://www.aperfectmatch.com/fordonors.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
25. See Kramer et al., supra note 2 (stating that in 2004, around 1 percent of all U.S. infants born
were conceived through IVF).
26. See Almeling, supra note 23, at 327.
27. Id.
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Typically, the process begins with the solicitation of eggs from a
woman with desirable characteristics.22 These can include the ability to
play a musical instrument; athletic achievement; superior academic performance, including high test scores on tests such as the SAT,23 LSAT, or
GMAT; college degrees; graduate school attendance; or professional degrees such as law degrees or degrees in medicine.24 Given the significant
debt incurred by attendees in those programs, it seems that the solicitations
are specifically targeted toward the more educated or accomplished classes
of women.25 However, solicitations do not limit requirements to objective
criteria such as scores or school attendance.26 Some include ethnicity requirements and appearance requirements.27
Advertisements commonly appear in student newspapers, targeting
women who are most likely to fit the aforementioned criteria. A 2010 study
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28. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte
Donors, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25, 29 (2010).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id. at 29.
32. See AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD-PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE FOR
PATIENTS 15–16 (2012).
33. Id. (noting that “many states allow for a declaration of parentage prior to the child’s birth”).
34. See, e.g., infra notes 88–98.
35. See AMER. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 32, at 5–6.
36. Id. (Noting that the ASRM supports this particular requirement).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. See Lynn M. Squillace, Too Much of a Good Thing: Toward a Regulated Market in Human
Eggs, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 135, 137 (2005).
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by The Hastings Center for Bioethics and Public Policy sampled 105 such
advertisements.28 The study found that the majority of those advertisements
were from agencies soliciting donations, and that most of the solicitations
promised compensation between four and five thousand dollars.29 The average compensation offered was $9,190 dollars.30 However, fifteen solicitations promised compensation between nineteen and twenty thousand
dollars, and five offered thirty to forty thousand dollars.31
The entire process, from stimulation to harvesting, involves substantial burdens on the donor. When a woman agrees to have eggs harvested,
she typically signs a contract including surrendering her parental rights to
any offspring from her eggs.32 Contracting happens privately between an
agency and the donor, establishing, among other things, payment terms and
obligations of both parties.33 However, given that there is little state regulation, there is generally no requirement that the donor obtains legal counsel.34 For that reason, it is unclear whether the donor truly understands the
legal and physical implications of permitting her eggs to be harvested for
cash.
Even if she fits the requisite qualifications, however, the donor must
submit to a series of genetic and blood tests to evaluate her suitability.35
Frequently, the donor must meet with a mental health counselor as well.36
Disqualifying characteristics can include a family history of mental disability or serious illness such as cancer.37 The requirements are quite stringent;
often, agencies request family information with great specificity, including
a family medical history for at least two generations.38
After a woman is recruited, medically tested, and approved, the process involved is both arduous and invasive, taking around six weeks.39 The
process involves three stages. First, the donor will be injected with hor-
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mones that suppress ovulation in preparation for stimulation.40 Lupron, one
drug commonly used for that purpose, has side effects such as hot flashes,
rashes, memory loss, chest pain, migraines, and dizziness, among
ers.41 Second, after hormone levels are suppressed, daily injections of either
follicle stimulating hormone or human menopausal gonadotropin are administered. This stage encourages multiple follicles to develop so several
mature eggs will simultaneously mature42 Finally, once the eggs are mature, an injection of human chorionic gonadotropin triggers ovulation.43
The eggs are typically retrieved about 36 hours after injection.44
Numerous complications can arise from this process. Risks from the
retrieval process include structural damage to organs close to the ovaries.
Severe injury to the bladder, uterus, bowel, or other pelvic structures is
possible.45 Other risks include lacerations, infection, and hemorrhage.46 As
with any surgery, there are risks inherent in using an anesthetic.47 However,
OHSS is the most significant concern.48 While the cause of OHSS is not
fully understood, it is likely caused by ovarian blood vessels reacting abnormally to high level of human chorionic gonadotropin in the donor’s
body.49 These blood vessels leak fluid.50 Serious cases of OHSS involve
blood clots, kidney failure, enlargement of the ovaries, and massive fluid
build-up in the body, requiring intensive care treatment.51 The prevalence
of OHSS in studies has ranged from 3 to 6 percent for moderate cases,
while more severe cases occur in 0.3 to 5 percent of those undergoing the
process, with the notable caveat that definitions of OHSS differ and that
consistent data is hard to find.52 However, because of the lack of any reporting requirement and the relative novelty of the process in general, other
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 195 Side B
03/25/2015 13:32:44

40. See Durrell, supra note 8 at 194. See also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in
Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE ON NONBIOLOGICAL PARENTING) 257,
264 (2002).
41. Shanley, supra note 40, at 264.
42. Id.
43. Durell, supra note 8, at 194.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 194–95.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Pratap Kumar et al., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, 4 J. HUM. REPROD. SCI. 70 (2011).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Durrell, supra note 8, as well as the note’s discussion in its entirety. See also Kumar et
al., supra note 48, where Kumar states that the rate of OHSS is between 0.1 percent and 3 percent. If
anything, the variance between the statistics highlighted in these studies illustrates the need for further
evaluation of the serious risk of OHSS.
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problems may exist that have gone undiscovered. Further, anecdotal evidence exists that the long-term effects of egg extraction might not be so
limited.53 Several women have reported cancer diagnoses years later, which
are thought to be a result of egg donation.54
II. THE EXPLOITATION EXPECTATION
If there are significant health risks from egg donation, is the process
too exploitative to continue? Much of the critical scholarship regarding egg
donation states that, because the process is physically and financially exploitative, compensation should be severely limited.55 Further, some arguments regard the risk of a potential “eugenic effect” as determinative. This
reasoning suggests that the ability to select the most “preferable” types of
genetic material might lead to a situation in which the rich and poor will
literally have different appearances. However, the most significant concern
raised is that of long-term physical harm and exploitation. Given the significant liberty interest at stake and the likelihood that the practice will continue in some form in the face of significant price regulations, what should
be addressed is not the monetary price of the eggs, but rather the potential
physical price that women might pay as a result.
A. Is Egg Donation Physically Exploitative? Examining the Organ
Analogy

See, e.g., Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
Id.
See Karsjens, supra note 1.
42 U.S.C. § 274e (2013).
Id.

03/25/2015 13:32:44

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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One critique of the egg extraction process likens the sale of human
eggs to that of human organs. Looking at that example, however, the analogy does not fit for several reasons.
The United States bans the sale of organs and non-regenerative human
tissue other than eggs.56 The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984
forbids the purchase and sale of human organs.57 The logic is partly based
on the premise that permitting the sale of organs such as kidneys is inherently damaging to the donor’s health. Kidneys and other organs do not
regenerate, and permitting the sale of these tissues could result in greater
risk of disease or other health externalities in the future than would otherwise exist. Therefore, banning the sale of non-regenerative organs has
some merits. While this Note does not purport to discuss the organ trade at
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58. ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). The
number cited is current as of the access date.
59. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
60. See Pregnancy After 35: Healthy Moms, Healthy Babies, MAYOCLINIC.COM (July 13, 2011),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pregnancy/PR00115.
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length, it is notable that this ban on organ sales creates a lack of available
organs. As of this writing, the Department of Health & Human Services
website, organdonor.gov, states that 123,655 people are waiting for an organ and that 18 people will die each day waiting for one.58
The other part of the argument relates to exploitation. The assumption
is that commodification of the human body disproportionately affects poor
and underprivileged people and is generally deleterious to the fabric of
society, emphasizing the binary between rich and poor. However, does the
logic behind banning organ sales apply to egg sales? On the one hand, as
reproductive tissue goes, egg and sperm sales cannot be equated. Women
have a finite amount of eggs. Eggs are clearly not regenerative tissue in the
same sense as sperm. The risks surrounding egg donation are also much
greater than sperm donation, and the process inherent in harvesting them
more arduous.
Yet neither can eggs be equated with organs. Eggs are plainly not essential to a woman’s bodily integrity in the sense of a kidney or other major
organ. A woman might choose to sell her eggs with absolutely no desire to
later have children. In that case, eggs have zero future value, and a woman
should be able to exploit that resource for whatever gain she can. Furthermore, should a woman desire to have children later in life, egg donation
does not necessarily preclude that possibility, though it might affect the
likelihood in some way.59 Yet the United States does not, and should not,
prevent women from having children later in life because of career or educational ambitions, mere circumstance, or simple desire. Neither does Congress ban women from having children after a certain age, despite
considerably greater risks of birth defects.60 Any paternalistic rationale for
banning the sale of eggs should therefore be rejected.
Certainly there is a justifiable concern with the risks outlined above.
The retrieval process is an inherently dangerous and invasive medical procedure. Further, the risk of OHSS includes the potential for immediate
health effects such as stroke or future risk of cancer or infertility. These
legitimate concerns support the need for health risk disclosure and other
similar regulation. However, health risks are implicated in many elective
medical procedures, such as plastic surgery. No other procedure also enables a woman to give a life to a childless couple or benefit in a financially
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significant way from the procedure. Rather than preventing a woman from
profiting from this process, regulations should facilitate a safer environment for donors, one in which willing women are made to fully understand
the risks before they donate, if they choose to do so.
B. Should Concerns about a Potential “Eugenic Effect” Preclude
Compensation for Egg Donors?

03/25/2015 13:32:44

61. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
62. STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).
63. See, e.g., Tia Ghose, Heritability of Intelligence, SCIENTIST (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/31016/title/Heritability-of-Intelligence/.
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The eugenic effect argument is a fear of something out of science fiction. In the movie Gattaca, the sale of designer reproductive tissue has
proliferated to the extent that the few remaining “normal” people are precluded from life advancement.61 In Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan, the super-rich designed hyper-intelligent, human ubermenschen who wrought
havoc on the rest of humanity.62 Luckily for critics of the process, the modern world has little to fear from the eugenic effect of egg donation.
First, as a practical matter, the science of intelligence and trait heritability likely precludes a significant eugenic effect. Recent studies have
suggested that half of intelligence is heritable, while the remainder is environmental.63 The very fact that humankind has yet to discern how intelligence is constituted in the human brain suggests that the supposed eugenic
effect is overblown. Even if these somewhat reductive beliefs about the
heritability of intelligence exist as motivating factors for the trade in eggs,
any rationale for regulating genetic choice should not rest on concerns
about what might happen based on private activities such as egg donation.
Second, a more pressing concern is the subtle issue of stigmatization
and societal pressure to conform to aesthetic standards. If the process of
egg extraction and donation proliferated, widespread implementation could
theoretically result in a bifurcated society. Those with wealth and means
would be able to select the most socially preferable genetic traits, such as
skin or eye color, creating “designer babies.” However, given that the government does not intervene in people’s individual choice of mates, neither
should the government regulate the decisions of individuals who wish for
their children to have certain traits. Notably, given the varying likelihood of
heritability for traits, there is no guarantee that the more “favored” traits
will actually materialize. There are too many variables with respect to genetics for the offering of “preferable” eggs to dramatically affect societal
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64. Almeling, supra note 23, at 325–27.
65. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. Id.
67. See Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, PEW SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1, 48 (Feb.
16, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-Intermarriage-II.pdf. While the study’s
summary appropriately lauds the recent increase in interracial marriage and acceptance thereof, it is
clear that the majority of marriages are between people of the same race.
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perceptions in ways more influential than present society has dreamed up
on its own.
Additionally, the stigmatization rationale should only apply to restrict
egg donations if it similarly applies to sperm donations. Sperm donors frequently are subjected to the same rigorous academic, physical, and frequently aesthetic requirements.64 These aesthetic desires are holdovers
from older societal perceptions of what kind of appearance is preferable.
Thus the question becomes whether this kind of selectivity in traits is a
symptom or a driver of the disease; it is far more likely, given the socialized nature of “attractiveness” and desirability, that such preferences fall
into the former category. As previously mentioned, even if reproductive
tissue donation eventually became more akin to a driver of such preferences, there is no reason that on its own, it would be more pervasive than
the influences of myriad beauty products and commercial media existing
presently.
Third, as a pragmatic issue closely related to that in the second point,
genetic selection happens during mating on a large scale generally. The
United States does not preclude couples from having children based on any
trait except those in which the government has a significant interest, such
as preventing inbreeding. Regulating mating choices smacks of government
overreach and the very kind the Supreme Court rejected in Loving v. Virginia.65 In overturning miscegenation laws, the Supreme Court in Loving
stated that marriage was a fundamental right.66 So too is the right to procreate. The opposite proposition permits a government to select with whom an
individual can reproduce, and fundamentally violates the principle of individual liberty and autonomy at issue in Loving.
In addition, it is evident that individuals in the United States tend to
self-select based on a variety of factors; most marriages are between members of the same race and educational background.67 While much is made
of the possible preference for blonde-haired, blue-eyed egg donors, a socially constructed preference should not impact the legality of a practice.
Notably, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), which
promulgates guidelines related to egg donation, prohibits member clinics
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from advertising based on particular aesthetic traits.68 However, clearly
some people refuse to reproduce with individuals who are not of a particular category, including on the basis of physical traits or standards like educational background. Pursuant to the liberty interest noted above, the
government would not attempt to impose mating selection on individuals as
a general matter; so too should the government refuse to do so in the case
of egg donation. Permitting compensation for egg donation actually conforms to this liberty interest in allowing individuals to choose the kind of
genetic material that will constitute their future children.
C. Is Egg Donation Financially Exploitative?

03/25/2015 13:32:44

68. Ethics Committee of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 4 at 307–08.
69. See For Donors, supra note 24.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 198 Side A

A more significant argument against the sale of eggs is one of financial exploitation. It is true that those willing to subject themselves to the
process of egg extraction are likely those in a difficult financial situation.
However, it is not as if an egg from one woman is considered as valuable
as an egg from another, unlike in the case of kidney sales. The women offered thousands of dollars for their eggs are college attendees or graduates,
sometimes with (or in pursuit of) graduate degrees.69 In other words, these
women have the intellectual capacity to understand the risks and rewards.
Certainly there is a risk that these young women will not have the
foresight to consider the risks to their future fertility or whether they will
suffer emotionally from not knowing whether they have biological progeny. However, situations abound in which young women, above the age of
eighteen, are considered responsible enough to make decisions that might
affect their future health. Both men and women work in high-risk professions because they are accorded a significant liberty interest and right to
contract. Take pornography as an example. This is a profession which
many people consider exploitative to at least some degree. Yet society
permits the profession to exist precisely because it implicates this liberty
interest and right to contract. Rather than driving the practice underground,
where exploitation will certainly occur, it is preferable to craft reasonable
regulations to protect participants.
Further, as a basic matter, women should be given the full ability to
deal with their bodies as they see fit. Restricting a woman’s ability to sell
her eggs harkens back to historical prohibitions against contraception and,
ironically, norms of a woman’s body as property (albeit in that case, her
father’s or husband’s). An element of protectionism undeniably persists in
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society with respect to women’s bodies. Denying women the agency to
contract and presuming their inability to weigh the issue is further paternalism that serves a well-meaning, if ill-aimed, purpose. This historical trend
has been tough to reverse, and it is certainly possible that a large part of the
uncomfortableness with which people approach questions of reproductive
rights stems precisely from this paternalistic background.
Yet it is true that there would be more cause for concern if those being
targeted by advertisements were poor women, and they were targeted due
to some drastic increase in the infertility of women generally. This is precisely the situation implicated in the now-illegal trade in organs. Still, as
noted above, eggs are not analogous to organs. Though eggs are finite, they
are not essential to a woman’s life in the sense of a kidney, for example,
which is required to filter waste. There are also obviously more eggs than
organs, and the demand is different, given that not every couple wishes to
have children, and most that do are capable of making use of their own
reproductive material. However, even if poor women were being targeted
by advertisements soliciting egg donations, that would still be insufficient
justification to ban compensation. Rather, such an occurrence would actually support the need for regulations that increase disclosure of potential
health risks, and protect the health of those who undergo these procedures.
That type of regulatory regime does not exist now. This should be rectified
going forward.
III. EXAMINING THE EXISTING REGULATORY REGIME
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 198 Side B

Given that there are significant health risks inherent in the egg donation process, strong regulatory mechanisms should exist to ensure that
those women who choose to become donors have all the information available to them. Further, these regulations should prevent the financial exploitation that can occur as a result of potential medical issues. Finally,
regulations should exist to facilitate the continued study of potential longterm harms such as cancer. This section evaluates existing guidelines and
potential regulatory options. Unfortunately, the existing guidelines are frequently voluntary, and where states have created statutory regimes, they are
frequently piecemeal and fail to address those longer-term issues.
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A. While Private Organizations Like the ASRM Promulgate
Regulations, the Lack of a Statutory Regime Precludes Meaningful
Enforcement

03/25/2015 13:32:44

70. Ethics Committee of the Amer. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 4.
71. Id. at 305.
72. See id.
73. Levine, supra note 28, at 26–27.
74. This Note does not argue that ASRM’s financial guidelines, or any financial limitations,
should be placed on clinics or interested parties.
75. See SART Newsletter, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. 1, 3 (Fall 2011), available at
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/Affiliates/SART/SART_Links/SART%20Newsletter%20SummerFall%202011.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
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While there are few government regulations controlling the use of this
technology, the ASRM has issued guidelines in concert with the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART).70 ASRM and SART are professional organizations that set standards for member-clinics to follow in
the advertisement, compensation, and performance of egg donation. The
ASRM ethics committee recommends limiting compensation for egg donation, stating sums of “$5,000 or more require justification and sums above
$10,000 are not appropriate.”71 These guidelines attempt to restrain the
potential for unbridled capitalism in the egg donation industry.72 And yet
these guidelines are frequently, if not routinely, flouted. As noted above,
the Hastings Center study indicated that over a quarter of solicitations exceeded the ASRM guidelines.73 There is obviously no enforcement mechanism for these guidelines outside of the independent regulations adopted by
the states.74
SART offers advertising guidelines, but these mainly pertain to potential exploitation of recipients.75 For example, SART’s advertising guidelines require that the advertisements comply with Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) guidelines, the advertisements’ claims are supported by
verifiable data, and the advertisements do not compare clinic-specific data
such as success rates.76 According to the guidelines, “live births must be
reported if within the time frame” of the report in question, and all cycles
within the period have to be reported.77 While the SART advertising guidelines present a framework for potential future regulations, they do not directly address the issues in question here.78
The ASRM also offers informed consent guidelines, requiring that
clinics provide “all relevant information necessary to make an informed
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decision,” and that potential donors have the ability to ask questions in
furtherance of their understanding.79 Accordingly, all donors should be
provided with comprehensive information concerning the benefits and
risks.80 These guidelines extend also to the recipient, who should be informed that there are alternative methods of rectifying infertility problems,
including adoption.81 All of these communications should be recorded in
medical records and written informed consent should be secured.82 Clinics
should provide counseling prior to donations so donors understand the potential negative psychological effects,83 such as that future desires to connect with their offspring might not be accommodated.
ASRM’s informed consent guidelines offer a model for states to follow in implementing mandatory informed consent. Independently, ASRM
guidelines do not have any teeth; violations offer no detriment to the violator except potential expulsion from the ASRM. Thus, there is frequently
little to no incentive for compliance. However, if these types of guidelines
were backed by significant civil or even criminal penalties for violations,
clinics and service providers would take notice and have greater incentive
to comply.
B. Federal Regulations are Non-Existent, and the State Statutory
Regimes are Piecemeal and Oftentimes Ineffective

03/25/2015 13:32:44

79. ARSM PRACTICE COMMITTEE, Revised Minimum Standards for Practices Offering Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 165, 168 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles
/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/R
evised_minimum_standards(1).pdf.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 167.
84. See, e.g., infra notes 101–105.
85. Levine, supra note 28, at 26–27.
86. See What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, supra note 15.
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There are no federal regulations regarding egg sales. This makes the
United States somewhat exceptional among industrialized nations.84 The
result of this laissez-faire atmosphere is that the market tends to determine
the price of eggs. As noted previously, though some donations are within
the cautionary margin of above $5,000 dollars and below $10,000, a full
quarter of the donations in one study did not adhere to the regulations.85
Further, there are no specific regulations regarding the informed consent of
egg donors. Nor are there any reporting requirements for negative health
effects on donors, while there are for success rates of IVF.86
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Additionally, the majority of states do not have any regulations on egg
sales.87 Louisiana prohibits compensation of egg donors for any reason.88
Arizona,89 California,90 Connecticut,91 Maryland,92 and Massachusetts93
prohibit compensating egg donors for research purposes,94 but do not prohibit the same for IVF. Arizona does have an informed consent statute,
requiring doctors to describe the hormone regimen, for example, and possible physical effects.95 Indiana permits compensation for egg harvesting for
IVF purposes, limiting the amount to $4,000 as compensation and expenses
for earnings lost, travel, hospital and medical expenses.96 New York allows
compensation and expenses for both IVF and research.97
In some cases, what little state regulation exists is almost completely
toothless. California recently passed a law requiring health risk warnings
for egg donations.98 However, this law only requires including health warnings with those advertisements that do not fall within the ASRM’s guidelines.99 This seems counterintuitive given that the health risks inherent in
the egg extraction process do not subside simply because compensation
falls within the ASRM guidelines. Recently, California’s Governor Jerry
Brown also vetoed a bill that would have permitted compensation for egg
donations for research as well.100 Given this survey of state prohibitions
and limitations, there remains a distinct lack of regulation with respect to
the three issues of informed consent, healthcare costs, and evaluating longterm health effects.
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87. See infra notes 88–98.
88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (stating that “[t]he sale of a human ovum, fertilized
human ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”).
89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1703 (West 2014).
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West 2012).
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-32d(c)(3) (West 2013) (stating in pertinent part, “[a] person who
elects to donate for stem cell research purposes any human embryos or embryonic stem cells . . . shall
not receive direct or indirect payment”).
92. MD. CODE ANN. ECON. DEV. § 10-439 (2008).
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8 (West 2003) (stating “[n]o person shall knowingly and
for valuable consideration purchase, sell, transfer, or otherwise obtain human embryos . . . for research
purposes.”).
94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1703; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325; CONN. GEN.
STAT § 19a-32d(c)(3); MD. CODE ANN. ECON. DEV. § 10-439; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111L, § 8.
95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1702.
96. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (West 2012).
97. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 265-a (West 2012).
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325.
99. Id.
100. Marc Lifsher, Egg Donor Payment Bill Vetoed by Brown, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/18/business/la-fi-capitol-business-beat-20130819.
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C. International Programs Might Provide a Model, but They
Frequently Proscribe Compensation
Conversely, many other countries do not permit egg sales for any
price. Great Britain, for example, follows the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990.101 The English regulatory agency, the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), discourages clinics from using
donors whom they suspect have been paid by the recipient.102 Under that
law, egg donors can receive compensation for expenses up to 750
pounds.103 Limited compensation for donors eliminates the financial incentive for donors, leaving solely an altruistic one. Many countries, such as
Israel and Denmark, restrict egg donation to egg-sharing as a solution to the
compensation problem.104 Others, such as Germany, bar compensation
outright.105
Under the health system in England, couples are also offered free IVF
treatment through the National Health Service’s egg-sharing process.106
During the egg donation process, there are frequently leftover eggs, which
can be distributed to or “shared” with other interested parties.107 This limits
the risk of harm to fewer women, and further rejects the idea that egg donation should be targeted at those with the supposed ideal characteristics,
which is the norm as exemplified by the solicitations described above. Additionally, egg-sharing reduces the cost of the IVF process; “appropriate”
donors who conform to the desires of the individual recipients cannot be
found since the very premise of egg-sharing is that the donors are anonymous.108 In England, for example, recipients are not informed about the
identities of their donors; however, individuals conceived after April 1,
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 200 Side B
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101. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22 (U.K.).
102. See Kamal K. Ahuja, et al., Egg Sharing and Egg Donation: Attitudes of British Egg Donors
and Recipients, 12 HUM. REPROD. 2845, 2845 (1997).
103. Egg Donation & Egg Sharing, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH.,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
egg-donation-and-egg-sharing.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2014).
104. K.K. Ahuja & E.G. Simons, Cancer of the Colon in an Egg Donor: Policy Repercussions for
Donor Recruitment, 13 HUM. REPROD. 227, 229 (1998).
105. See Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 MOUNT SINAI J. OF
MED. 255, 256 (2004). According to the article, compensation is illegal in Norway, Sweden, and Japan
as well. Id.
106. See Can I get IVF treatment on the NHS?, NHS (May 8, 2013),
http://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg156/resources/guidance-fertility-pdf; see also NAT’L INST. FOR
HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, FERTILITY: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH FERTILITY
PROBLEMS 42–43 (2013).
107. Egg
Share
Programme,
UNIV.
HOSPS.
COVENTRY
&
WARWICKSHIRE,
http://www.uhcw.nhs.uk/ivf/treatments/esp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
108. See If You Were Conceived after 1 April 2005, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH.,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/5526.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
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2005, are able to inquire to the HFEA regarding identifying information
about their biological parents.109
Egg-sharing provides a viable alternative for those couples who lack a
specific genetic desire for their progeny or the funding to be more selective.
However, egg-sharing does not eliminate the market for more selective
alternatives. Additionally, egg-sharing is arguably more coercive in some
ways. Egg-sharing regimes require couples to give up the ability to choose
their offspring’s genetic origins. Significantly, this is the other end of the
spectrum from the “eugenic effect” noted above that is feared by some.
Couples should have some ability to choose the genetic origins of their
children. Defaulting to a system in which egg-sharing is the only option
implicates this significant liberty interest and might also drive more selective-minded couples to countries with a more permissive regulatory environment.
D. The FTC has Power to Penalize Those Who Issue False and
Misleading Advertisements, but cannot Address the Significant Deficits in
Information Given to Donors

03/25/2015 13:32:44

109. Id.
110. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FYI: FTC Gives Final Approval to Consent
Agreement with Arizona Institute of Reproductive Medicine, Ltd. (Oct. 3, 1995), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/10/fyi-ftc-gives-final-approval-consent-agreementarizona-institute.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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While there are no federal regulations directly relating to advertisements soliciting egg donors, the FTC has brought suit against advertisers
for false and misleading claims related to in-vitro fertilization success
rates.110 For example, in 1995, the FTC reached a consent agreement with
the Arizona Institute of Reproductive Medicine (AIRM) with respect to
fabricated success rates.111 AIRM counted multiple births (e.g., twins or
triplets) as multiple deliveries, raising their in-vitro success rates.112 In their
advertisements, AIRM compared their success rates favorably to those
collected and published by SART, which reports such multiple births as
single deliveries.113 Finally, AIRM reported the national average incorrectly; while SART reported the national average as around 17 percent, AIRM
stated that it was 14 percent.114 In either case, had AIRM counted multiple
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births as single deliveries, AIRM’s numbers would have been lower than
the national average.115
While the FTC retains the power to address false and misleading
claims in solicitations for egg donors, the FTC does not monitor compliance with advertising requirements, though it could if they were adopted, as
proposed by this Note. Additionally, the FTC’s present powers enable the
organization to assign relatively minor civil penalties for those false and
misleading claims. As noted in the consent agreement with the AIRM detailed above, a consent agreement “does not constitute admission of a law
violation.”116 Subsequent violations of orders can result in civil penalties up
to $10,000.117 Given the extent of the trade at issue, and the sizeable sums
involved in the purchase and sale, these types of civil penalties are unlikely
to have a significant deterrent effect. Stronger advertising requirements
should be adopted, both by the FTC independently and with the assistance
of Congress.
E. While the FDA could Choose to Evaluate the Risks of Drugs Used
in Egg Extraction, They have Failed to do so Thus Far

03/25/2015 13:32:44

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See FDA Drug Safety Communication: Ongoing Safety Review of GnRH Agonists and Possible Increased Risk of Diabetes and Certain Cardiovascular Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
available at
http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm20984
2.htm#table (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FDA Drug Safety Communication].
119. Lupron Depot, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 5,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/020011s040lbl.pdf (last updated Jan. 2012).
120. FDA Drug Safety Communication, supra note 118.
121. Id.
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The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has previously evaluated Lupron, though not for its common use in the egg donation process.118
Off-label use of drugs like Lupron is not illegal, and is in fact quite common. Thus, while the FDA has noted potential risks for Lupron use in specific contexts, the FDA has yet to evaluate whether Lupron presents
different risks when used for egg extraction.
Lupron functions by shutting down testosterone production in men
and estrogen production in women.119 Lupron was originally developed to
treat hormone-responsive cancers such as prostate cancer.120 The drug is
FDA-approved for that purpose, as well as more recently for endometriosis
and fibroids.121 However, off-label uses are common; as noted above, Lu-

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 202 Side A

03/25/2015 13:32:44

12P - RADECKI FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

REGULATING EGG DONATION

3/19/2015 3:17 PM

747

03/25/2015 13:32:44

122. See, e.g., Cathy L. Brizek, et al., Increased Incidence of Aberrant Morphological Phenotypes
in Human Embryogenesis, 12 J. OF ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 106, 107 (1995).
123. FDA Drug Safety Communication, supra note 118.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Lupron Depot, supra note 119, at 8.
127. Id.
128. Proposed Changes to Approved Thalidomid Package Insert, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 1
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/021430s000,020785s031lbl.pdf (last visited
Feb. 13, 2015).
129. Jerome B. Zeldis et al., S.T.E.P.S.: A Comprehensive Program for Controlling and Monitoring Access to Thalidomide, 21 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 319, 320 (1999).
130. Proposed Changes to Approved Thalidomid Package Insert, supra note 128, at 10.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 325–28.
133. Id. at 320.
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pron is one drug frequently used in the first stages of the stimulation process necessary for multiple-egg extraction.122 The FDA has not evaluated
the safety or effectiveness of Lupron when used in the context of the egg
donation process.123
Significant risks exist even when Lupron is used in approved ways.124
According to the FDA, hyperglycemia, increased risk of diabetes, and increased risk of heart attack and stroke have all been reported by men taking
Lupron as treatment for prostate cancer.125 Lupron’s prescribing information notes that women have reported hot flashes, headaches, mood
swings, myalgia, and a decrease in bone density.126 As noted previously,
the full effects of Lupron on women who undergo the egg donation process
are not yet known due to this off-label usage.127
Since it is clear that the FDA has not evaluated the risks of Lupron in
a way useful to consumers for the purposes of this article, the question then
becomes whether FDA regulations of other risky drugs present a viable,
existing alternative. For example, the sedative thalidomide is known to
cause a high rate of severe birth defects when administered to pregnant
women.128 The solid work of FDA physicians kept the drug from the American market in the mid-1960s, and the drug was only approved in 1998 for
treatment of leprosy129 and in 2013 for multiple myeloma.130 When thalidomide was approved for leprosy, the FDA implemented a strict regulation
system.131 Pharmacists must register with the manufacturing Celgene Corporation, patients must fill out surveys regarding their use of the drug, and
women using thalidomide must take two forms of birth control and undergo
pregnancy tests.132 This program is called the “System for Thalidomide
Education and Prescribing Safety,” or “S.T.E.P.S.”133
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Certainly such a program would address critics’ concerns that Lupron
is not being monitored properly with respect to usage in the egg extraction
process. But the first step, prior to any form of requirements, is to evaluate
the safety of Lupron for egg extraction and the long-term effects of the
process on women’s health. This requires the FDA to oversee the use of
Lupron for such ends, which the FDA has thus far failed to do. While thalidomide might provide an example of how Lupron can be monitored in the
future, the problems with the egg extraction process are more multifaceted
and the dangers less obvious due to the length of time at issue. The FDA
should first evaluate the effects of Lupron on women who undergo the egg
extraction process. Subsequent to a determination about the health effects,
a policy determination can be made. However, the FDA requires assistance
in determining the effects of egg extraction, given that the individuals who
undergo the process are so geographically disparate and the process is presently unregulated in most states. This leads to the necessity of reporting
requirements, which will be discussed further in this Note.
IV. TOWARD A MORE PROTECTIVE REGULATORY REGIME

03/25/2015 13:32:44

134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1702 (West 2014).
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Due to the significant interests in protecting the health and safety of
donors outlined above, it is clear that the United States requires a stronger
regulatory regime. While the argument that compensation should be nominal should be rejected, due to the individual right to contract, the circumstances under which women enter into donation contracts can be regulated.
There is a significant state interest in protecting the lives and livelihoods of
donors. At present, regulations are insufficient to protect the women who
undergo these procedures. Without such regulation, financial and physical
exploitation is likely to continue. However, there are three areas in which
substantial improvement and greater regulation can occur.
First, with respect to informed consent, states should adopt requirements mandating that agencies describe the potential health risks of egg
extraction in their solicitations. This requirement should also extend to the
actual clinics that participate in the extraction process, along the lines of
Arizona’s law mandating informed consent standards.134 Second, clinics
should be obligated to pay health coverage for the negative health effects
resulting from OHSS. Statutes could compel clinics to purchase short-term
insurance policies covering these ill effects. Women suffering from serious
medical problems as a result of OHSS should not be required to pay for
procedures, which, in many occasions, exceed the dollar amount of their
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compensation. Finally, a federal reporting requirement should exist to document the long-term health effects of OHSS and egg extractions. As noted
above, there is a significant lack of information about the prevalence of
these conditions, particularly pertaining to the long-term health effects.
While individuals obviously cannot be required to report their medical
conditions, clinics performing these procedures can report the rates of
OHSS and attempt to collect information on the long-term effects of this
procedure through their access to former donors.
A. States should Develop and Mandate Informed Consent
Requirements for Egg Donations

03/25/2015 13:32:44

135. See, e.g, Egg Donation Risks and Side Effects, TINY TREASURES L.L.C.,
http://www.tinytreasuresagency.com/donors/risks/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
136. Melinda Henneberger, The Ultimate Easter Egg Hunt: ‘Ivy League Couple’ Seeks Donor with
‘Highest Scores,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-thepeople/wp/2013/03/21/the-ultimate-easter-egg-hunt-ivy-league-couple-seeks-donor-with-highestpercentile-scores/.
137. Durrell, supra note 9.
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While many egg extraction clinics do provide information about potential health risks and side effects,135 states should adopt statutes mandating that such information be provided. First, each advertisement,
irrespective of whether it conforms to ASRM guidelines, should note the
potential health effects. Second, all clinics should outline in detail each
negative health ramification that could result, including rare but serious
effects such as OHSS and possibly even cancer.
However, regulations should not restrict advertising content, whether
that relates to the type of individual solicited or the amount of money to be
paid. For example, an advertisement that states that “[w]e are an Ivy
League couple . . . seeking the help of a special woman who is a healthy,
Caucasian, with highest percentile ACT/SAT scores . . . tall, slender, dark
to light blonde hair, blue eyes, and under the age of 28” should not be altered for that content, however questionable.136 However, each advertisement should be required to divulge the most relevant potential health risks.
For instance, the above advertisement should include reference to the potential harms that arise from OHSS. They should note, at the least, that
severe instances of disease occur in 0.3 to 5 percent of cases, and that the
most severe cases result in sterility.137
At a bare minimum, states should adopt ASRM guidelines and require
that clinics conform with respect to informed consent and disclosure. While
clinics frequently disclose the extent of the risk to some degree, a more full
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explanation, both of the potential long-term effects and the short-term consequences, should be required. In particular, each individual should, in
accordance with ASRM disclosure guidelines, undergo mandatory counseling prior to donation.138 This practice would minimize criticism that young
women are less aware of the psychological effects of having offspring by
ensuring that they are fully briefed on the consequences of egg extraction.
Additionally, advertisements should at the very least note that the
long-term effects of OHSS have not been fully explored. While anecdotal
evidence indicates that some long-term risk of cancer exists, the evidence is
yet equivocal.139 In a sense, this follows the regulation of any medication.
Everyone is accustomed to hearing the list of side effects at the end of a
commercial for one medication or another. Mandating that advertisements
include reasonable warnings does not impose an inappropriate burden on
agencies that seek out young women as donors. Rather, such warnings
adequately address the significant concern that young women in need of
money might be exploited by overly optimistic representations of the difficult process which they will face if they choose to become donors.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, each clinic which performs the
egg extraction procedure should be required to provide certain information
relating to informed consent. New York, for example, requires that information surrounding the risks of use of hormones be described to the donor.140 A sample form states:

Similarly, Arizona has led the way in requiring that the adverse potential from egg donations be described to donors.142 In many ways, Arizona’s
description could serve as a model for federal or further state regulation.
The statute requires, in part:
2. A description of all procedures to be performed on the egg donor, including the purpose, duration and estimated recovery time for each procedure.
See ARSM PRACTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 165–68.
See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.8 (2008).
12A NEW YORK FORMS: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ch. 28B:26 (West, Westlaw updated through
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1702 (West 2014).
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The possible risks and complications from retrieval of eggs from my
ovaries and the prolonged use of hormones has been explained to me and
I understand these risks and complications. I understand my failure to
comply with instructions given by, or to appear for appointments
with, [name of laboratory or institution] may negatively impact my
health. In addition, I understand that [I] shall be responsible for the cost
of any medical treatment of complications arising from my donation.141
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3. Medically accurate disclosures concerning all potential risks of egg
donation that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of whether to undergo the procedure, including the medical risks associated with the surgical procedure and the drugs, medications and
hormones prescribed for ovarian stimulation during the process.
4. A description of the effects that the surgical procedure and the drugs,
medications and hormones may have on future attempts of the egg donor
to become pregnant.
5. Notice that the egg donor cannot be completely informed of all potential risks or effects because all potential risks or effects and the magnitude of those risks or effects may not be known.143
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The benefit of presenting the risks to potential donors far outweighs
the incidental cost of some women refusing to donate. In fact, mandating
universal disclosure requirements would only enable women to better
weigh costs and benefits of undergoing an egg extraction. At present, the
majority of states lack any mandated requirement to inform women of the
risks.144 Providing such information ensures that those going through the
procedure understand the risks, and thus might be better for the industry in
the long run, given the potential harm of lawsuits or reputational harm that
a lack of information might promote.
However, nothing in these requirements or disclosures should enable
clinics to escape financial liability for resultant harms. Rather, by requiring
that clinics affirmatively address these harms, states can ensure that women
make the best possible decision for their physical, rather than financial,
health in choosing to undergo egg donation. Disclosure does not necessarily impute comprehension; further, enabling clinics to escape liability simply by virtue of laying out potential harms defeats the purpose of shifting the
burdens on the clinics. Therefore, disclosure should be conceptualized as
relating to the risk of physical harm. Then, if physical harm occurs, clinics
can still alleviate what would otherwise be a potentially crippling financial
burden if laid on the women themselves.
In sum, an informed consent requirement in both advertisements and
prior to procedures would enable the industry to protect itself from liability
while ensuring that women are cognizant of all the potential harms that
might result. Equal information protects the liberty interest of women in
availing themselves of egg donation, while simultaneously protecting those
women, as members of the public, from physical exploitation. While some
might argue that these regulations would reduce the availability of eggs,
this is not a negative effect: women who would not donate if knowledgea-
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ble of the risks should not be donating in any case. Providing information
ensures that both parties are willing to incur the relative costs and benefits,
and protects both parties from the former.
B. Clinics should Bear the Financial Burden for Negative Health
Effects on Donors
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145. See Kramer et al., supra note 2, at 3145.
146. Durrell, supra note 9. See also the discussion at supra note 9.
147. Id. at 221.
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As noted previously, OHSS can have severe health effects such as
stroke or even infertility.145 Though the incidence of severe OHSS is relatively rare, when it occurs, donors can be left with significant health care
costs far exceeding their monetary compensation. Therefore, states should
require clinics to pay the healthcare costs of women who undergo egg extraction and suffer from health problems such as severe OHSS. Requiring
that clinics purchase short-term health insurance for donors could suffice,
assuming such insurance covered OHSS, While some might contend that
this requirement will lower the compensation for egg donors, the benefit of
protecting donors far outweighs the potential costs.
Presently, most compensation for injuries suffered during medical
procedures relies on malpractice claims. As a general matter, this obviously
requires there to be some misdeed by the physician in the process of the
procedure. Yet malpractice coverage is insufficient for the kind of harms at
issue here. OHSS is not always a result of malpractice; the syndrome can
occur in between 0.3 to 5 percent of cases where the drug regimen is administered properly.146 Therefore, the issue is not one of malpractice, but of
inherent risk. And the potential harm is great; the most severe cases of
OHSS can result in life-threatening complications.147 Typical malpractice
recovery would not account for such injuries.
However, these medical costs also should not be placed on the soliciting couples. Loss-spreading is best practiced when there is a wider base
upon which the harm will lie. This soft-landing approach of requiring clinics to pay medical costs also achieves the same goal that targeting couples
would; those benefiting most from the egg extraction process are the ones
who should compensate donors for their harms. It is the clinics, rather than
the couples, who possess a primarily financial motive. Additionally, these
clinics provide services to many individuals, and have the financial capacity to account for the harms inherent in their work. While this loss-spreading
might lead to slightly higher costs to couples, or slightly lower compensa-
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C. Congress should Create a Reporting Requirement Regarding the
Long-Term Effects of Egg Extraction
Finally, Congress should require that clinics which perform egg extractions attempt to retrieve periodic information about former donors. This
proposal stems from the relative novelty of the procedure and the prominent concern among some advocates that egg extraction can result in cancer
or other long-term risks to a woman’s health. This is not a radical suggestion, but one inspired by existing law.149 The 1992 Fertility Clinic Success

03/25/2015 13:32:44

148. Levine, supra note 28, at 35.
149. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, supra note 15.
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tion for donors, it is better to share the effects of the harms up-front than
cripple, financially and physically, donors who are relative neophytes to
this specific market.
Next, requiring couples to pay for the sometimes-staggering cost of
medical care resulting from egg extraction could have a dissuasive effect.
This dissuasive effect should not be favored as it implicates a risk alluded
to at the outset of this Note; where couples are dissuaded from engaging in
egg donation in a jurisdiction, they are likely to merely change forums. The
regulatory regime with the greatest utility provides donors with information
sufficient to reach a conclusion about the risk to their health and healthcare
coverage to prevent financial harm while still providing a favorable environment for soliciting couples who have an understandable desire to reproduce.
Given that one of the most salient concerns of the entire egg donation
process is the exploitation of the women who donate, payment of medical
expenses mitigates a significant potential harm. Requiring that clinics pay
for short-term health insurance, or medical bills in the case of severe medical issues arising from the procedure, ensures that such exploitation will
not occur. Certainly, agencies often target women who have significant
amounts of student loans and other debt.148 Providing that these women do
not have to pay for medical care resulting from severe OHSS and other
illnesses would ensure that they are not making a choice that will further
cripple them financially. It is obvious that potential physical harms cannot
always be mitigated. Yet society must help balance the interest in protecting these donors and facilitating their liberty interest. Mandating that clinics provide health coverage for this condition provides an adequate balance
between the interest of donors in their own health, and the interest of recipients and clinics in finding such donors.
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Rate and Certification Act, for example, requires fertility clinics which
perform IVF to provide data for all procedures performed to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).150 The CDC then provides annual
reports on success rates and monitors all clinics for compliance with the
standards included in the Act.151
While not perfectly analogous circumstances, a similar requirement
for periodic monitoring and reporting would provide the CDC and the government the ability to evaluate the long-term risks inherent in the egg extraction process and guide future regulation of the industry. Certainly a
requirement to monitor former patients for a period would involve clinics
committing more resources than when they merely reported their own success rates. However, clinics presumably retain the contact information of
donors, and requesting change-of-address notification and distributing periodic health feedback forms would not represent an insurmountable administrative burden or financial cost on these profitable institutions.
Additionally, while feedback response by former donors would be voluntary, such a program could provide valuable information.
Specifically, the Act has enabled a large amount of scholarship on the
efficacy of IVF and encouraged various non-governmental organizations to
provide information about clinics and their relative success rates.152 For
example, the SART’s website has an interactive map where potential parents can seek out clinics in their area, and look at the efficacy of each
one.153 One can imagine a future in which donors might be able to look at a
similar map for clinics to donate, looking at their rates of OHSS and potentially evaluating their accreditation, if legislation included that standard.154
Key within this proposal would be the information-gathering about future health effects, however. In the presently unregulated field of egg extraction, women cannot properly weigh the risks and rewards of donating
eggs. More information is needed for individuals to make informed decisions. Given the significant and yet-unevaluated long-term risk of cancer
inherent in the egg extraction process, more information is needed to guide
future regulations. Collecting information from this largely unregulated
industry, across fifty disparate states, suggests the need for creation of such
a reporting requirement. While reporting requirements are rare, they are not
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unheard of in nascent industries that present potential long-term issues or
significant risk of harm, as was the motivation behind the 1992 Act dealing
with in-vitro fertilization.155
Proponents of the egg donation industry should be sympathetic to this
proposal as well, as a substantial amount of criticism of the egg extraction
process stems from accusations of opaqueness and consequent exploitation.
Providing more information to the scientific community enables legislators
to decide how to further regulate the egg extraction industry. Perhaps most
importantly, providing women with adequate information that has implications for their future health is the best way to promote responsible donations, whereas clouding the process in secrecy encourages skepticism and
more criticism.
CONCLUSION
With the proliferation of assisted reproductive technology, both supply
of and demand for these services is bound to increase. While some seek to
curtail compensation for donors, the truly problematic aspect of the egg
donation process lies with a poor regulatory environment. Advertising and
informed consent requirements enable young women to make reasoned,
independent decisions about medicine and their own bodies. Requiring
health coverage protects the physical and financial health of donors. A
federal reporting requirement ensures that the long-term risks that are yet
unknown will not stay unknown forever. Together, these regulations can
provide that egg donation serves not only the interests of the industry, but
also the women who are so intimately involved in it.
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